1. Introduction {#s0005}
===============

Whereas policies that promote exports or limit imports are considered acceptable development strategies, the frequent use of policies that restrict exports, such as export bans or export taxes, have left economists puzzled ([@b0035], [@b0120]). By restricting exports, production is diverted to the domestic market, which raises supply and suppresses prices. In the short run, this benefits consumers or downstream industrial users at the expense of producers of those goods. However, theoretical and applied models show that producer welfare losses generally outweigh gains in consumer welfare, leading to a net decline in welfare ([@b0105], [@b0055]). Moreover, when these policies remain in place for an extended period, producers respond by altering supply, which, as we demonstrate in this paper, could either reduce welfare further and/or make the policies ineffective.

Despite their negative welfare effects, the distributional properties of export bans make them attractive to policymakers. Increased food availability at lower prices is most commonly the justification for export restrictions on staples ([@b0105]). Another is that the policy shields domestic markets from price spikes in world markets, which protects consumers, and explains why many countries banned exports during the 2007/08 global food price crisis. However, export bans are likely to be ineffective if some trade takes place informally across porous borders---as is often the case in developing countries---or where bullish traders hoard stocks in anticipation of an eventual domestic price recovery ([@b0120]).

Export restrictions can also form part of an industrial strategy. Fledgling agroprocessing sectors receive an implicit subsidy when export restrictions are imposed on raw commodities used as intermediate inputs ([@b0090]). This allows processors to better compete with imported goods, which means the policy is essentially a variant of infant industry protectionist policies that traditionally restrict competing imports through tariffs or quotas. An important rationale for such policies is to retain processing margins locally and to create manufacturing sector jobs ([@b0105]).

There are several other justifications for export restrictions: export levies may be a source of government revenue; a retaliation to trade restrictions imposed by trading partners; or used to protect scarce natural resource or restrict trade in illicit goods (see [@b0085]). While these are all legitimate justifications for export restrictions, the focus in this study is on trade restrictions imposed on agricultural products and their implications for food security and industrial development in a developing country context.

Since export restrictions transfer benefits from producers to consumers or industrial users, political economy considerations are pertinent ([@b0005], [@b0020]). Consumers, including net-consuming farm households, typically represent a larger share of the electorate than net-producers; hence politicians have an incentive to adopt policies that favor consumers over producers. Industrialists, in turn, are often better organized or possess stronger lobbying power than smallholders, which may explain the existence of protectionist industrial policies at the expense of the smallholders.

Unfortunately, given their short-term view, politicians may overlook the fact that policies that persistently discriminate against farmers or create market uncertainty may become self-defeating in the longer run. When export restrictions remain in place for too long, or when the decision-making process around imposing or lifting export restrictions is highly discretionary, they suppress prices or create market uncertainty for producers. Risk-averse farmers' rational response to low prices or market uncertainty is to shift productive resources towards more profitable crops or to revert to self-sufficiency ([@b0065]), which could have negative long-term consequences for agricultural production, growth and food security. Therefore, farmers' behavioral responses in the long run may ultimately undermine the food security and industrial development objectives of export restrictions.

While the impacts of export restrictions at sector-level are well understood, few studies have considered the broader economywide effects. Thus, in addition to highlighting the important differences in policy impact in the short versus medium to longer run, our study also emphasizes the spillover effects the policy may have on other sectors, factor and commodity markets, and household incomes, both in rural (farm) or urban settings. We particularly consider the case of Malawi, a country which until very recently had a long-standing export ban on the main staple maize with the objective of promoting food security. For several years now Malawian policymakers have also debated the option of an oilseed export levy to increase domestic value-addition of oilseeds, which have been identified as priority intermediate inputs for its emerging food processing sector.

Using a general equilibrium model, we simulate the impact of export restrictions under various scenarios designed around assumptions about policy implementation modalities, policy timeframe, and the fundamental macroeconomic relationships in the economy. In the case of the export levy, we also explore options for utilizing revenue generated by the levy to enhance the intended policy effect. While the results generated are specific to Malawi, and are influenced by this country's trade patterns, inter-industry linkages, and consumer preferences, as observed during a particular period, we believe the simulated behavioral responses have implications for other developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where many economies, like Malawi, are reliant on a large agricultural sector, face significant food security challenges, and have ambitions of diversifying their economies and developing their industrial base.

2. Trade restrictions in theory and practice {#s0010}
============================================

2.1. Malawian context {#s0015}
---------------------

Malawi is a small economy where a large majority of the workforce is engaged in agricultural production. Yet, it faces persistent food security challenges. It also has an underdeveloped industrial sector which has proved to be a major stumbling block to economic transformation. For these reasons, Malawi represents an interesting case study of a country that has frequently used or proposed to use temporary or long-term export restrictions to attain its food security and industrial development goals.

In this Malawi is not alone: in the past decade, more than 30 countries, including virtually all the world's top grain producers and several southern and eastern African countries have imposed grain export restrictions ([@b0120]). The detrimental effects of such restrictions are confirmed by several studies. For example, [@b0120] shows that both the levels and volatility of prices is higher during periods of export bans in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. In Tanzania, maize export bans reduce producer prices and cause significant market uncertainty for farmers and the private sector, ultimately making these actors less responsive to future supply and trade opportunities ([@b0055], [@b0010]). Moreover, by lowering low-skilled wages and returns to land, export bans disproportionately harm poor rural households ([@b0055]). At a global level, it is now commonly agreed that the collective action of several countries banning exports during 2007/08 exacerbated the food price crisis through reducing global supply ([@b0035], [@b0015]).

With respect to maize in Malawi, the key staple crop, export bans are imposed to maintain a perception of food sufficiency ([@b0045]). Government has also cited protection of its investment in the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP), a large fertilizer subsidy program in place since 2005/06 and designed to boost smallholder maize production, as a reason for banning maize exports ([@b0060]). Following intermittent bans on maize exports since the 2005/06 cropping season, an export ban was in place, uninterrupted, from 2011/12 until the end of 2017. The government regulates international trade of so-called "strategic crops" through its *Control of Goods Act* (2015). Commodities listed in the act, such as maize, require an export license. Export bans are therefore enforced by withholding licenses, which in practice means formal exports through recognized border posts are affected.

Given the political and socioeconomic importance of maize in Malawi, the export ban has always been a highly sensitive topic, and any advocacy on the matter was done discreetly. By contrast, the proposed restriction on oilseed exports has been openly debated. The context is the National Export Strategy (NES) 2013--2018, which prioritizes development of three product clusters: oilseeds, sugar, and manufactures. These were selected based on their global competitiveness, linkages to other sectors, and potential for increased value-addition ([@b0075]). The oilseed cluster is prominent among these, and the product strategy for oilseeds entails promotion of sunflower, groundnut, soya, and cotton production and exports in the short term (five years), followed by increased diversification and domestic value-addition (e.g., production of cooking oil, lubricants, biofuels, and so on) in the medium to longer term (ten to fifteen years).

In line with these provisions, oilseed producers enjoyed a policy environment conducive to free trade for several years. However, in 2015, under pressure from cooking oil processors, government proposed the imposition of oilseed export levies purportedly to fast-track domestic value-addition. Oilseeds were eventually added onto the list of products in the *Control of Goods Act* (2015) late in 2015, but removed again early in 2016, contributing to uncertainty among value chain actors.

2.2. Theoretical considerations {#s0020}
-------------------------------

A standard assumption in trade analysis is that small countries cannot directly influence global market prices; instead the chain of causality in open economies is that world prices have a determining influence on domestic prices ([@b0050]). However, small country governments can influence global prices faced by domestic agents through taxes (i.e., import duties or export levies) or quantity restrictions (i.e., import or export bans or quotas).

Supply-and-demand diagrams are useful for illustrating the welfare effects of such trade restrictions in a partial equilibrium (single-sector) context. We provide a synthesis of the theory here; see [@b0105] or [@b0095] for a detailed exposition and diagrams. Since export bans divert exports to the domestic market, and export levies lower earnings of producers, both policy measures lower producer welfare. The effects are different in the short run when the supply curve is assumed to be perfectly inelastic (vertical), denoting the fact that farmers cannot instantly respond to price changes once they have invested in inputs for the current cropping season, and the long run when the supply curve is relatively elastic (upward-sloping). In the long, therefore, producers can mitigate welfare losses through behavioral changes (i.e., reducing supply).

Consumers, on the other hand, are responsive to price changes in both the short and long run, as depicted by their downwards-sloping demand curves. Since export restrictions cause consumer prices to decline, consumer welfare increases. In the case of export levies, government shares in the welfare gain in the form of increased tax earnings. In all these scenarios, in both the short and long run, consumer and government welfare gains outweigh producer welfare losses, implying a net welfare loss to society.

The relative size of the demand and supply elasticities determine the extent of the net welfare loss. As explained by [@b0105], net welfare losses associated with export bans are lower in the long run when supply is more responsive, whereas those associated with export levies are higher in the long run due to increased distortionary effects of taxes. Export bans will also induce greater net welfare losses when demand is more inelastic, while export taxes are associated with larger welfare losses when applied to commodities with a high elasticity of demand.

These observations are pertinent when considering the type of commodities to which export restrictions are applied. For example, in Malawi, demand for staples such as maize tends to be inelastic, whereas marketed maize supply (i.e., not including production for own consumption) is more elastic in the long run due to the relative ease of switching to alternative field crops compared to, say, disinvesting in tree crop production. Maize export bans frequently imposed in Malawi will therefore lead to differential welfare effects in the short and long run, owing mostly to the responses of producers. In the case of soya, for example, which would be targeted under a proposed oilseed export levy in Malawi, household demand not only accounts for a small share of overall demand, but is also price sensitive, whereas supply is elastic in the long run. Welfare losses associated with soya export restrictions are therefore likely to be high for producers.

Partial equilibrium supply-and-demand diagrams such as those presented by [@b0105] can help us form a broad understanding of the possible effects of export restrictions within specific subsectors. However, more complex economywide models are required to understand both the direct (within-sector) and indirect (spillover) impacts on prices, quantities and income distribution across all sectors and markets in the economy. Pertinent questions that can be addressed with such more comprehensive models include: how do farmers redirect their investments once export restrictions are imposed in (say) the maize and oilseed sectors; how do consumers respond to relative price or household income changes; how do investors and government respond to the anticipated deteriorating trade balance or exchange rate depreciation as far as their resource allocation decisions are concerned; and, in the case of export levies, how does the policy affect government revenues and how does it choose to spend the additional revenue? Given the limitations of partial equilibrium approaches in this context, as well as our interest in economywide effects, in both the short and medium- to longer-term, we use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model in our analysis of export restrictions.

3. Model and simulations {#s0025}
========================

3.1. Model overview {#s0030}
-------------------

We use the Static General Equilibrium (STAGE) model ([@b0100]), calibrated to a 2010 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Malawi ([@b0115]) with a detailed account structure, including 50 commodities (19 in agriculture), 15 factors of production (labor, land, and capital), and 30 representative farm and non-farm households categorized by expenditure quintile. A brief description of the model is provided directly below, while a listing of model parameters, variables and equations is provided in the [Appendix A](#s0085){ref-type="sec"}. The [Appendix](#s0085){ref-type="sec"} also elaborates on the SAM.

Compared to their recursive-dynamic variants, static general equilibrium models are appropriate when the analytical focus is on the impact of a once-off policy shock, or where the inter-temporal path of adjustment (i.e., in terms of capital accumulation, labor force growth, or sectoral productivity growth) is not critical to the analysis. The static model also permits sufficient flexibility in terms of factor market closure rules to permit analysis of both short and medium- or longer-run effects. The fundamental behavioral relationships governing household consumption, production, and government transactions are identical in static and recursive-dynamic models.

Production in the STAGE model is defined by a multi-level nested structure, specified for each sector, with fixed input--output relationships and variable factor use governed by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Household consumption consists of either marketed commodities or home-produced goods as specified in the SAM. Consumption behavior is defined by a linear expenditure system (LES), whereby minimum quantities of each commodity are considered subsistence consumption and are unresponsive to price changes; the balance of consumption expenditure is discretionary and responds to relative price or income changes. We assume income elasticities of demand of 0.8 (slightly inelastic) and 1.2 (slightly elastic) for food and non-food commodities, respectively. These are comparable with average elasticity values of 0.7 and 1.3 for Malawi in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database ([@b0110]), as well as those used by [@b0030] to model agricultural investment impacts.

With respect to trade flows, a CES function determines the substitutability between and optimal mix of imported and locally produced goods consumed domestically, subject to their relative prices. Likewise, a constant elasticity of transformation function (CET) determines the optimal allocation of domestically produced goods across domestic and export markets. We set CES and CET elasticities to 2.0, which means producers and consumers are reasonably responsive to relative changes in domestic and world prices. By comparison, average CES and CET elasticity values in the GTAP database are around 2.4 for both agricultural and non-agricultural tradeable commodities ([@b0110]). These values are widely used in trade policy analyses, also in Malawi by [@b0025] to simulate the economywide effects of agricultural input subsidies. As explained below (Section [3.3](#s0050){ref-type="sec"}), we run and report on results from several sensitivity tests on the robustness of our results to different LES and CET elasticities, and hence we consider results across a broad range of plausible income and trade elasticity values.

Government collects direct and indirect tax revenue, provides government services, and makes welfare transfers to households. Surplus funds in the recurrent budget are available for investment financing, while a deficit is financed through government borrowings. Households and incorporated business institutions serve as other sources of national savings, which are pooled together with government savings to fund current investments.

CGE models are neoclassical at heart and their assumptions of perfect competition and rational behavior by agents can be considered limitations in some contexts. However, structural rigidities can be imposed (e.g., through the use of appropriate closure rules) to capture certain non-neoclassical features of economic behavior (see Section [3.3](#s0050){ref-type="sec"}). [@b0080] discuss more general limitations of CGE models, noting that model results are not predictions of the future but rather thought experiments on the impact of a policy change under certain conditions. Since these models are theoretical rather than empirical as in the case of econometric models, the potential for rigorous testing against experience is limited. Results may also be sensitive to model parameters, and while sensitivity analyses can be carried out---as we indeed do in this study (see Section [3.3](#s0050){ref-type="sec"})---many parameters that define behavior are calibrated on the basis of the SAM data, which may be flawed. Of course, these criticisms apply to other types of economic modeling as well, and in this regard [@b0080] maintain that CGE models remain the preferred tool for ex ante analysis of trade policy issues.

3.2. Simulation design {#s0035}
----------------------

### 3.2.1. Maize export ban {#s0040}

Maize is a dominant crop in Malawi, accounting for 28.8 percent of agricultural GDP (see [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}). However, over 60 percent of maize is consumed by producers themselves, and much of the balance is traded informally. This means the maize market is relatively thin, and only a small fraction of formally traded maize is reaches the export market, and only when export parity prices are favorable. In 2010, for example, less than 0.4 percent of maize production was exported even though no export restrictions were in place at the time ([Fig. 1](#f0005){ref-type="fig"}). By 2011 export parity prices were more favorable and significant quantities of maize were formally exported before an export ban was reintroduced late in 2011. On average, during the 2009--2011 free trade period, about five percent of all maize produced was exported.Fig. 1Formal and informal maize exports in Malawi, 2004/05 to 2014/15 Source: Malawi Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) and Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).Table 1Changes in real GDP at factor cost (value-added): maize export ban and oilseeds export levy simulations.GDP (value-added) 2010 (baseline)% change relative to base^\*^Maize export ban15% oilseeds export levy15% oilseeds export levy + proc. subsidyGDP (MWK millions)National GDP share (%)Agric. GDP share (%)Short run closure (*sim1a*)Long run closure (*sim1b*)Short run closure (*sim2a*)Long run closure (*sim2b*)Short run closure (*sim2c*)Long run closure (*sim2d*)National GDP953,383100.00.00.00.00.00.00.0Agriculture310,33132.6100.0−0.2−0.60.0−0.10.0−0.1 Field crops, staples, and pulses144,15215.146.5−5.0−1.8−0.3−2.9−0.2−2.8  Maize89,3059.428.8−13.5−4.30.61.20.91.2  Other cereals11,6891.23.86.43.20.30.70.40.7  Roots17,1501.85.510.43.20.81.30.91.3  Pulses15,1551.64.97.60.90.50.50.30.5  Groundnut50600.51.610.53.0−9.1−4.3−9.3−4.3  Oilseeds57930.61.912.00.9−14.1−93.0−14.3−92.9 Fruits & vegetables21,9762.37.18.03.10.40.90.10.9 Export & other crops23,1922.47.513.24.40.716.50.316.2 Livestock, forestry & fishing121,01012.739.01.6−0.70.1−0.20.0−0.1  Industry158,53216.61.01.20.00.10.10.1 Food & agroprocessing57,7566.1−2.72.00.02.61.12.9  Meat processing12780.17.5−0.60.2−0.41.40.0  Grain milling72100.8−21.9−11.50.0−1.12.5−0.5  Export agroprocessing25,6042.70.52.10.06.40.06.2  Other food-processing^\*\*^63670.7−3.9−1.7−0.10.07.22.1  Beverages17,2971.8−0.5−0.30.0−0.20.0−0.2 Mining & other manufacturing100,77510.63.12.30.0−1.3−0.6−1.4  Services484,52050.8−0.20.00.00.00.00.0 Trade & business services371,46239.0−0.10.00.00.10.00.1 Government & other services113,05811.9−0.70.00.1−0.2−0.1−0.2[^1][^2]

Since maize exports were negligible in 2010, the SAM base year, we recalibrate the SAM to be more representative of the overall economic structure and maize trade flows over the period 2009--2011, i.e., up to the point when the export ban was reintroduced. This "adjusted" baseline is only used for the maize export ban scenarios. The model is useful for not only simulating the immediate impact of the policy change in 2011, but also the medium-to-longer-run effects of a policy that remained in place until the end of 2017.

Malawi's maize export bans usually apply to both maize grain and processed maize (flour), and therefore the simulation is also implemented as such. Maize flour is produced by the "grain milling" sector, where it accounts for around two-thirds of that sector's output and virtually all its exports. However, the grain milling sector is relatively small: household expenditure on maize grain is almost five times that of flour since most processing is done at home; also, flour exports account for less than one percent of flour production. The temptation is to ignore the flour export ban in our simulations, but of course, a failure to extend the ban to flour could result in grain being diverted via the flour export market.

In the standard STAGE model specification, a CET function determines the optimal allocation of maize across domestic and export markets. For the export ban simulation, we override this specification and divert all produced maize to the domestic market. The approach is comparable to [@b0040] import ban simulation, although in that instance the adjustment was on the CES function. This approach is preferable to alternative approaches that have been adopted in CGE model applications, such as setting prohibitively high export levies or very low world export prices to induce a shift in supply to the domestic market. Such simulations have the disadvantage of creating distortionary effects in local markets that are inconsistent with the way the ban is implemented in practice (e.g., levies generate government revenue which alters government behavior, while world price shocks directly influence domestic prices). Our approach also differs from that of [@b0055] in which informal maize exports flowing directly from the farm gate to the border were suspended---as was appropriate in the Tanzanian setting they modelled---but formal exports flows were still permitted via the CET function.

We model two scenarios. In the short-run scenario (*sim1a*) there is no supply response from producers, i.e., domestic production is restricted to equal the sum of the base-level exports and domestic supply. In the longer run scenario (*sim1b*), maize producers have the option to reallocate resources away from maize production to more profitable crops, subject to overall land constraints; however, all produced maize is still supplied to the domestic market.

### 3.2.2. Oilseeds export levy {#s0045}

The National Export Strategy (NES) oilseed cluster identifies cotton, groundnut, soya, and sunflower as priority subsectors for development in Malawi ([@b0075]). Among these, cotton is the most important export earner and fourth largest export sector in Malawi behind tobacco, sugar, and tea. Cotton trade is regulated separately under Malawi's *Cotton Act* (2013) and is excluded from the proposed oilseed export levy. Our focus is therefore on the remaining three priority oilseeds: groundnut is included as a distinct subsector in the SAM, while soya and sunflower are jointly represented by the "oilseed" subsector.

Groundnut is an important smallholder food and cash crop in Malawi. The SAM suggests half of groundnut production is consumed by producers themselves. Of the marketed surplus, two-thirds is consumed by private households. Demand for outputs from the agroprocessing sector is minimal, with most of the balance of domestic supply---around 15 percent of total production---being exported. This relatively small sector contributes 1.6 percent to agricultural GDP ([Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}).

Soya and sunflower are mostly grown as cash crops, and household own and marketed consumption are negligible. They are also highly traded crops, with significant quantities imported (e.g., during the cropping season) and exported (e.g., during the marketing season) throughout the year: imports make up one-third of annual domestic supply, while exports roughly match domestic production. The balance of demand consists almost entirely of intermediate input demand from the "other food processing" sector, which includes manufacturing of cooking oil. Soya and sunflower account for 13 percent of that sector's total intermediate input expenditure, and account for 1.9 percent of agricultural GDP ([Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}).

Apart from direct implications for producers, the particular value chain features suggest the oilseed export levy will impact oilseed processors via intermediate input-use channels, while consumers will be impacted mostly via the groundnut consumption channel. In our simulations, we impose a notional 15 percent ad valorem tax on oilseed and groundnut exports. The resulting increase in domestic supply of oilseeds at lower prices will reduce production costs in the food processing sector, with cost savings passed on to consumers. Importantly, since input-output ratios are constant, industrial demand for oilseeds will depend on demand for processed foods (e.g., cooking oil).

Unfortunately, data availability in the Malawi supply-use-tables prevent us from separating the oilseed processing sector from the other food processing sector in the SAM, which impacts on the precision of our export levy results. One possibility is to introduce imperfect substitution among intermediate inputs rather than fixed input-output ratios. Thus, when oilseed prices decline, we would observe an increase in demand for oilseeds. However, this is also problematic for at least two reasons: firstly, cooking oils are produced using a very simple process of crushing oilseeds, and hence a fixed input-output ratio is appropriate; and secondly, substitution among very distinct inputs changes the output composition of food products in the model, which violates assumptions on the demand-side of the model.

Two sets of simulations are conducted as part of the oilseed export levy scenarios. In the first, all export tax revenue is added to government savings and made available to finance current investments. As before, we consider both short (*sim2a*) and long-run (*sim2b*) scenarios. Under a second set of short (*sim2c*) and long-run (*sim2d*) scenarios, the same policy shock is simulated, but export tax revenue is ring-fenced to finance an oilseed processing subsidy aimed to enhance the domestic value-addition effect of the policy. Under a revenue-neutral assumption the subsidy rate depends on the amount of export tax revenue collected, and is expressed as a percentage of the value of output. In practice, as we shall see, this implies subsidies of 8.2 and 2.4 percent in the short run and long run, respectively, with the latter reflecting the sharp decline in oilseed production and exports in the long run, and hence revenues available to finance the subsidy.

3.3. Market clearing conditions and sensitivity analysis {#s0050}
--------------------------------------------------------

We adopt model closures that can be considered standard in a developing country context such as Malawi. As noted, in the short run scenarios, agricultural production is effectively fixed and factors of production are fully employed but immobile across subsectors. A less stringent assumption applies for non-agricultural sectors, where we assume labor is not only fully employed but also mobile across sectors, although capital is sector-specific (immobile). A long-run scenario relaxes the restrictive assumptions for the agricultural sector, allowing farmers to reallocate land and labor in response to the simulated shock; similarly, greater flexibility is also permitted in the non-agricultural sectors where we assume flexible capital stock allocation.

As far as the macroeconomic closures are concerned, we assume a flexible exchange rate regime consistent with current Malawi policy. Since export restrictions worsen the trade balance, we expect the exchange rate to depreciate to maintain the balance on the external account. For national savings and investments, we assume the share of current investments in domestic absorption is fixed. Private savings rates are flexible and adjust to achieve the target level of investment.

In the export ban simulations, we assume that government savings is a flexible residual amount after accounting for expenditure, which is fixed as a share of domestic absorption. The same closure applies in the first set of export levy scenarios, while in the second set of simulations government savings is fixed and the export tax revenue is recycled to finance a production subsidy, as described above.

Finally, we conduct a series of sensitivity tests to determine the robustness of our model results to changes in elasticity values. Of potential significance to our export ban results are the income elasticities of demand (LES function), which were arbitrarily set to 0.8 in the benchmark simulation. The export levy results, in turn, could potentially be sensitive to the choice of export supply elasticities (CET function), which were set at 2.0 in the benchmark. The sensitivity tests entail adjusting these LES and CET elasticities upwards or downwards by 25 percent and rerunning the simulations.

4. Results and discussion {#s0055}
=========================

4.1. Maize export ban {#s0060}
---------------------

[Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"} presents the baseline GDP estimates by sector, calculated at factor cost (value-added) and reported in millions of Malawi Kwacha (2010 prices). The table also shows percentage changes in GDP relative to the baseline (or in the case of the maize export ban simulations, the "adjusted" baseline) for the various simulations. In the short run (*sim1a*), the introduction of the maize export ban has a significant impact on sectoral GDP, with declines of 13.5 and 21.9 percent in the maize and grain milling sectors, respectively. Agricultural production is assumed unchanged in the short run (see *QXC* in [Table 2](#t0010){ref-type="table"}), but since exports (*QE*) are diverted to the local market, domestic maize grain supply (*QQ*) rises by 6.8 percent, which in turn causes a 15.5 percent decline in maize grain prices (*PQD*). The supply shock in the domestic market is somewhat cushioned by the fact that maize imports (*QM*) decline sharply (48.6 percent), albeit from a low base.Table 2Price and quantity effects of maize export bans (selected activities/commodities).% change relative to baseShort run closure (*sim1a*)Long run closure (*sim1b*)Domestic prices (*PQD*)Domestic production (*QXC*)Exports (*QE*)Imports (*QM*)Total domestic supply (*QQ*)Domestic prices (*PQD*)Domestic production (*QXC*)Exports (*QE*)Imports (*QM*)Total domestic supply (*QQ*)Field crops, staples & pulses−11.0--−52.50.94.2−3.1−3.9−51.7−0.20.1 Maize−15.5--−100−48.66.8−3.3−6.6−100−25.10.0 Other cereals−13.7--3.24.61.0−2.30.14.51.30.4 Roots−2.4--9.3−8.50.0−3.00.18.5−7.60.1 Pulses−2.8--0.0−7.60.0−4.00.10.0−9.60.1 Groundnut−1.6--2.9−4.3−0.5−4.21.88.8−8.10.5 Oilseeds−0.1--−0.12.72.61.01.01.01.71.7Fruits & vegetables−1.4--1.2−3.2−0.2−1.30.33.0−3.0−0.1Export & other crops1.0--0.1−1.3−0.10.43.86.6−3.32.7Food & agroprocessing−0.91.0−0.5−4.01.0−0.51.32.0−2.30.4 Meat processing0.30.0−1.11.40.5−0.61.94.4−1.30.8 Grain milling−13.04.0−100−20.75.2−5.40.1−100−10.12.0 Export agroprocessing0.90.20.3−0.4−0.30.72.32.9−1.1−0.1 Other food-processing^\*^−5.12.48.4−4.00.4−0.91.13.9−2.00.1Mining & other manufacturing1.62.411.7−1.5−0.30.71.69.5−0.8−0.2  Exchange rate1.81.0[^3][^4]

As a manufacturing sector, the grain milling sector does not face the same production constraints as agricultural producers in the short term, and therefore output increases by 4 percent. Overall supply increases by 5.2 percent, causing flour prices to decline by 13 percent. Rapidly falling maize grain and flour prices result in declining wages and profits, which explains the large decline in GDP ([Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}) in both the maize and grain milling sectors.

In the long run (*sim1b*) the direction of price changes is the same as in the short run, but smaller in magnitude due to behavioral responses from maize producers. Maize grain and flour prices decline by 3.3 and 5.4 percent, respectively. This is associated with a 6.6 percent decline in maize grain production, which, together with the decline in imports, almost exactly offsets the quantity of maize previously exported, such that there is no change in the domestic availability of maize. Grain milling output is virtually unchanged. Under the more flexible long run closure, productive resources are released from the maize and grain milling sectors and reallocated to more profitable activities. The small depreciation in the exchange rate (the cost of foreign currency increases by one percent) caused by the loss of maize export earnings makes the export crops and export agroprocessing sectors attractive targets for diverted investments, leading to production increases of 3.8 and 2.3 percent in these two sectors, respectively ([Table 2](#t0010){ref-type="table"}).

The greater responsiveness of maize producers in the longer run helps them partially mitigate producer welfare losses, as evidenced by the smaller decline in maize GDP, which now falls by 4.3 percent (see [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}). However, the overall agricultural sector suffers a greater reduction in GDP, i.e., by 0.6 percent, compared to a 0.2 percent decline in the short run, partly because of more mobile productive resources, such as labor, being attracted to non-agricultural sectors.

These structural shifts in the economy and their associated implications for household incomes, combined with shifts in relative prices, have welfare implications for households. [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"} summarizes changes in disposable household income and maize consumption quantities by household subgroup. The most striking result in the short-run is a 1.4 percent decline in rural disposable income (*HEXP*), which stands in contrast to the 1.8 percent increase in urban areas. Among farm households, the largest losses occur among medium and large-scale farmers (2.4 and 1.7 percent, respectively), who more likely produce a marketable surplus and are therefore vulnerable to price shocks. Smallholder farmers, on the other hand, are more often subsistence-oriented and net-consumers of maize, and hence are less affected than larger farmers, although compared to their short run situation they are now worse off because they are less able to exploit new opportunities in non-maize sectors. [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"} also disaggregates household groups by their poverty status (the poor are defined here as the bottom two quintiles). Almost 60 percent of poor rural households are classified as medium-scale farmers, which is what drives the result for the rural poor. Among all these rural household groups, only non-farm households benefit from export bans (2.1 percent gain) as their incomes are not directly linked to the profitability of maize.Table 3Disposable income and consumption effects of maize export bans for different household groups.% change relative to baseShort run closure (*sim1a*)Long run closure (*sim1b*)Disposable income (*HEXP*)Maize grain cons. (*QCD~g~*)Grain flour cons. (*QCD~f~*)Disposable income (*HEXP*)Maize grain cons. (*QCD~g~*)Grain flour cons. (*QCD~f~*)Rural households−1.44.64.6−0.8−1.70.9 Rural households (by farm type)  Smallholder farmers−0.16.05.6−0.5−1.31.2  Medium-scale farmers−2.44.02.9−1.2−2.1−0.1  Large farmers−1.73.32.4−0.9−1.80.4  Non-farm households2.111.77.10.95.03.7 Rural households (by poverty)  Rural poor^\*^−2.25.04.5−1.3−2.20.1  Rural non-poor−1.14.54.6−0.7−1.61.5  Urban households1.811.28.70.92.64.1 Urban households (by poverty)  Urban poor^\*^0.38.77.7−0.1−0.63.1  Urban non-poor1.811.38.70.92.74.2  All households0.05.56.1−0.1−1.22.1[^5][^6]

Among urban households, the non-poor gain more than the poor, which reflects this group's ability to benefit from increased economic activity in the non-agricultural sector. Of course, the nuances of the household welfare impacts are lost through aggregation into representative groups. More detailed micro-modelling would be required to better understand impacts on different types of households, although such modelling is not possible within a consistent economywide model framework.

Maize grain (*QCD~g~*) and flour (*QCD~f~*) consumption increases across the board in the short run, thanks to the sharp decline in prices and increased availability. Consumption levels increase more for households that are more likely net-consumers of maize, e.g., urban non-poor or rural non-farm households.

In the long run (*sim1b*), we still note an increase in disposable incomes for urban households (0.9 percent) and a decline for rural households (0.8 percent), although changes are somewhat smaller than in the short run owing to behavioral responses. Medium and large-scale farmers can mitigate some of the short run losses by reallocating resources to export crops in particular. Smallholder farmers, on the other hand, are less likely to benefit from such opportunities and experience larger income losses than in the short run (0.5 percent). Poor households, particularly in rural areas, also experience a decline in disposable income levels, with the policy now only benefiting urban non-poor and non-farm rural households who benefit from cheaper food and employment opportunities in the expanding non-agricultural sector.

Despite lower prices, consumption of maize grain in the long-run declines by 1.2 percent nationally, while maize flour consumption increases by 2.1 percent. This indicates a slight demand shift away from grain towards maize flour, which becomes relatively cheaper. However, household expenditure on maize grain still dwarfs that of maize flour, which means in quantity terms net maize consumption declines by about one percent.

From a food security perspective, the small decline in maize consumption is perhaps not an alarming result, especially when considering increased availability of alternative staples or pulses at lower prices ([Table 2](#t0010){ref-type="table"}). However, it is evident that a long-term maize export ban does not contribute to maize availability or access; instead, it more likely reduces production and supply in the long run. A more liberalized trade policy regime is more likely to encourage commercial maize production and may ultimately be more effective at promoting food security. It is disconcerting, however, that export bans are regressive, favoring urban non-poor households at the expense of poorer farmers.

4.2. Oilseeds export levy {#s0065}
-------------------------

The relatively small size of the groundnut and oilseed sectors in Malawi means that even a substantial export levy of 15 percent is unlikely to have large economywide implications or raise significant amounts of government revenue. [Table 4a](#t0020){ref-type="table"} shows the results from the short (*sim2a*) and long run (*sim2b*) scenarios where export tax revenue is added to the pool of government savings. Since the domestic consumer market for groundnuts is relatively large, producers can divert exports to the domestic market (11.6 percent) with relative ease, leading to sharp price declines (7.4 percent). By contrast, oilseeds (soya and sunflower) are mostly used domestically as an intermediate input for which demand is less robust and not as responsive given inflexible manufacturing input-output relationships. Hence, only a small share of exports is diverted (0.8 percent) and domestic prices decline only marginally (0.8 percent). In addition, the slight increase in oilseed import price (by 0.1 percent) dampens the effect of the export levy on domestic prices of these commodities as imports of oilseeds contribute to over 90 percent of domestic supply. A relatively large portion of production is still exported but now taxed, which means profitability of the oilseed sector is severely affected; hence the sector suffers a larger contraction in GDP (14.1 percent) compared to groundnut (9.1 percent) ([Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}).Table 4aPrice and quantity effects of oilseeds export levies (selected activities/commodities).% change relative to baseShort run closure (*sim2a*)Long run closure (*sim2b*)Domestic prices (*PQD*)Domestic production (*QXC*)Exports (*QE*)Imports (*QM*)Total domestic supply (*QQ*)Domestic prices (*PQD*)Domestic production (*QXC*)Exports (*QE*)Imports (*QM*)Total domestic supply (*QQ*)*15% oilseeds export levy*Field crops, staples & pulses−0.3--−1.9−1.40.0−0.7−3.2−79.0−3.9−0.3 Maize−0.1--0.3−0.20.0−0.80.12.1−1.80.1 Other cereals−0.2--0.0−0.10.0−0.4−0.31.7−0.4−0.4 Roots0.0--0.2−0.10.0−1.00.12.9−2.60.1 Pulses−0.1--0.0−0.30.0−1.30.10.0−3.00.1 Groundnut−7.4--−11.6−15.01.90.5−4.8−27.6−2.2−1.0 Oilseeds−0.8--−0.8−4.5−2.85.0−93.2−94.8−12.3−19.8Fruits & vegetables0.0--0.0−0.10.0−0.30.11.0−0.70.0Export & other crops0.1--0.00.00.0−0.212.312.2−3.712.2Food & agroprocessing0.00.10.00.00.10.14.511.1−0.2−0.1 Meat processing0.20.0−0.30.30.10.1−0.1−0.20.0−0.1 Grain milling0.00.10.20.00.1−0.20.00.8−0.70.0 Export agroprocessing0.00.00.00.00.0−0.19.211.5−2.9−0.1 Other food-processing^\*^0.00.10.3−0.10.10.4−0.3−1.10.5−0.1Mining & other manufacturing0.10.0−0.10.00.00.2−0.8−5.40.30.2  Exchange rate0.10.1[^7][^8]

Given the small decline in oilseed prices and the fact that oilseeds account for only 13 percent of intermediate input demand in the food processing sector, the benefits to that sector are limited. Output increases by only 0.1 percent ([Table 4a](#t0020){ref-type="table"}). Also, since there is no significant change in processed food prices, consumers switch towards cheaper agricultural produce. Value-added therefore declines, albeit very marginally (0.1 percent; [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}), which means the policy does not achieve its objective in the short run.

In the long run, we observe a very significant supply shock from primary oilseed producers (decline of 93.2 percent). Since production is almost decimated, a relatively larger share of domestic supply is now made up of imports, but total domestic oilseed supply declines by 19.8 percent. Together with the small depreciation of the exchange rate, which raises the cost of imported oilseeds, this causes the domestic oilseed price to increase by 5.1 percent. While the large negative production shock may seem inconsistent with a price increase, it is important to reiterate that prices reported in [Table 4a](#t0020){ref-type="table"}, [Table 4b](#t0025){ref-type="table"} are consumer prices, whereas producers responds to producer prices, which are not reported (see definition for *PXC* in [Table A2](#t0040){ref-type="table"}). In this instance, oilseed producer prices actually move in the opposite direction to consumer prices, i.e., they decline by 2.9 percent, which is also much larger than the decline for any of the other crops (these range from −0.5 to −1.4 percent). This explains the relatively large disinvestment in oilseeds.Table 4bPrice and quantity effects of oilseeds export levies with a processing subsidy (selected activities/commodities).% change relative to baseShort run closure (*sim2c*)Long run closure (*sim2d*)Domestic prices (*PQD*)Domestic production (*QXC*)Exports (*QE*)Imports (*QM*)Total domestic supply (*QQ*)Domestic prices (*PQD*)Domestic production (*QXC*)Exports (*QE*)Imports (*QM*)Total domestic supply (*QQ*)*15% oilseeds export levy*Field crops, staples & pulses0.5--−2.12.80.2−0.6−3.2−79.0−2.7−0.2 Maize0.8--−1.21.40.0−0.70.22.1−1.70.2 Other cereals0.3--−1.33.91.1−0.3−0.21.70.70.0 Roots0.7--−0.30.30.0−0.90.12.9−2.60.1 Pulses0.3--0.00.20.0−1.20.20.0−2.90.2 Groundnut−7.1--−11.9−14.62.00.6−4.8−27.6−2.2−1.0 Oilseeds−0.5--−0.90.72.35.1−93.2−94.7−10.6−18.3Fruits & vegetables0.3--−0.10.20.0−0.20.11.0−0.70.0Export & other crops0.2--0.0−0.30.0−0.112.111.9−3.712.0Food & agroprocessing−1.31.50.4−5.71.1−0.34.811.0−2.10.3 Meat processing1.40.0−2.93.91.30.20.30.20.50.3 Grain milling0.51.91.22.61.9−0.10.61.3−0.10.6 Export agroprocessing0.30.1−0.10.30.50.09.011.2−2.80.0 Other food-processing^\*^−5.07.224.8−9.21.8−1.21.85.8−2.40.4Mining & other manufacturing0.2−0.4−1.80.0−0.10.2−0.8−5.60.30.1  Exchange rate0.20.2[^9][^10]

The price effect for groundnut is much smaller thanks to a more robust domestic market: whereas the consumer price increases by 0.6 percent, the producer price declines by 1.4 percent (not reported). However, the export levy ultimately fails to lower input prices for oilseed processors. Output in the food processing sector declines by 0.3 percent and value-addition is virtually unchanged. Productive resources are diverted to export crop and export agroprocessing sectors, where value-addition increases 16.5 percent and 6.4 percent, respectively ([Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}).

[Table 4b](#t0025){ref-type="table"} presents results from the short (*sim2c*) and long run (*sim2d*) export levy scenarios in which export tax revenues are used to finance an oilseed processing subsidy. A detailed discussion of these results is omitted; suffice to say, this policy now indeed raises value-addition in the food processing sector by 7.2 percent in the short run ([Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}), but still fails to mitigate the negative effects of the tax for primary producers. Thus, in the long run, primary oilseed production and exports decline by just as much as in the "no-subsidy" simulation (*sim2b*), which drastically reduces revenue from the levy. Consequently, whereas in the short run the processing subsidy rate could be set at 8.2 percent, it drops to only 2.4 percent in the long run, and hence value-addition is now only 2.1 percent higher than in the baseline.

Finally, we consider changes in disposable income levels (see [Table 5](#t0030){ref-type="table"}). In the absence of the oilseed processing subsidy (*sim2a* and *sim2b*) the oilseeds export levy harms farmers, particularly medium- and larger-scale farmers who are more actively engaged in cash crop cultivation. Urban households who consume relatively more processed foods benefit slightly, and these effects are amplified in the long run. The oilseed processing subsidy (*sim2c* and *sim2d*) helps alleviate the negative effects for rural households in the short run, particularly the poor, but in the long run the significant reduction in funding for the subsidy leads to a distributional outcome that is similar to the "no-subsidy" scenario. Irrespective of whether a subsidy is introduced or not, the oilseed export levy worsens the rural-urban income divide in the long run.Table 5Disposable income effects of oilseeds export levies for different household groups.% change relative to base15% oilseeds export levy15% oilseeds export levy with processing subsidyShort run closure (*sim2a*)Long run closure (*sim2b*)Short run closure (*sim2c*)Long run closure (*sim2d*)Rural households−0.1−0.20.1−0.2 Rural households (by farm type)  Smallholder farmers0.10.00.30.1  Medium-scale farmers−0.1−0.40.1−0.3  Large farmers−0.2−0.6−0.1−0.5  Non-farm households0.20.30.10.3   Rural households (by poverty)  Rural poor−0.1−0.30.2−0.3  Rural non-poor0.0−0.20.1−0.2  Urban households0.20.30.10.3 Urban households (by poverty)  Urban poor0.10.10.20.1  Urban non-poor0.20.30.10.3  All households0.10.00.10.0[^11]

4.3. Sensitivity analysis {#s0070}
-------------------------

For our sensitivity analysis, all modeled simulations are rerun with higher and lower income elasticities of demand for maize (these govern the responsiveness of household demand to price changes) as well as higher and lower elasticities of transformation for oilseed crops (these determine the ease of shifting output from export to domestic markets or vice versa). A detailed discussion is omitted, although key results for two sets of sensitivity simulations are presented in [Table A3](#t0045){ref-type="table"}, [Table A4](#t0050){ref-type="table"}.

Two key observations can be made. Firstly, maize grain and flour consumption is more sensitive to changes in the income elasticity of demand in the short-run than in the long-run scenarios. A 25 percent decrease (increase) in the elasticity causes the consumption response to be about ten percent lower (higher) than the simulated benchmark consumption change. For example, at national level, maize grain consumption increases 5.5 percent in the short run ([Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"}), but this increase is 0.57 percentage points lower (4.9 percent) for the lower elasticity value and 0.42 percentage points higher (5.9 percent) at a higher elasticity value (see [Table A4 in the Appendix](#t0050){ref-type="table"}). In the long-run, the deviation from the benchmark is much smaller, in relative terms. For example, whereas maize grain consumption declines 1.2 percent in the long run, the decline is 0.04 percentage points less at the lower elasticity value and unchanged at the higher elasticity value.

Second, with respect to the oilseed levy, higher (lower) elasticities of transformation understandably cause the policy response of diverting supply to the domestic market to be somewhat larger (smaller), and these responses tend to be larger in the long-run scenarios. In general, however, elasticity changes effect only minimal changes in results relative to the benchmark simulations, and therefore they do not alter the main conclusions of our analysis (see [Table A5 in the Appendix](#t0055){ref-type="table"}).

5. Conclusions {#s0075}
==============

Export restrictions on staple foods or cash crops are frequently imposed in developing countries to promote food security or industrial development goals. By diverting domestic production to the local market, export restrictions reduce domestic prices and increase domestic supply of food or intermediate inputs to the benefit of consumers or downstream industrial users. In countries where these interest groups make up a large share of the electorate, and where food insecurity or the lack of industrial development are emotive issues, export restrictions are often politically motivated.

General equilibrium model simulations are used to assess whether export restrictions achieve their stated objectives in the short and long run, using Malawi's long-standing maize export ban and a proposed export levy on oilseeds as test cases. While the results are specific to Malawi, the type of behavioral responses we observe are have implications for archetypal agrarian developing economies, many of which, like Malawi, have dual ambitions of ensuring food self-sufficiency and developing their agroprocessing sectors to facilitate economic transformation and reverse the trends of rising (processed) food import bills.

Our results show that in the short run Malawi's maize export ban achieves its stated objective of increased food security, measured narrowly in terms of availability of maize at lower prices. Maize consumption increases by around six percent. However, these gains come at a cost to the rural farm sector, which suffers a 0.2 percent decline in agricultural value-added and lower disposable income levels, especially among poor farmers. In the long run, maize prices still decline, which is good for consumers, but supply is constrained as producers shift to other crops. The net effect is that maize consumption declines by around one percent, while agricultural value-addition declines by 0.6 percent. Also in these scenarios urban households, particularly the non-poor, experience rising disposable income levels at the expense of rural farm households.

We also find that a 15 percent oilseeds export levy is unlikely to achieve its goal of increased value-addition in processing sectors, unless the tax revenue generated is used to finance a production subsidy for oilseed processors. In the long run, whether processors are subsidized or not, we note a very significant production response from oilseed producers (soya and sunflower) who lower production by over 90 percent. Given robust demand for groundnut from domestic consumers, the supply response is smaller for groundnut producers.

As in the case of the maize export ban, an oilseed export levy tends to benefit urban consumers at the expense of rural producers in the short run, and even more so in the long run. In the short run, the subsidy to processors mitigates some of the negative welfare effects for rural households by lowering food prices, but the sharp decline in export tax revenue in the long run prevents government from continuing to offer a generous food processing subsidy. Thus, irrespective of how export tax revenues are utilized in the scenarios explored, the distributional effects of the policy are biased against the poorest rural households and favor better-off urban households in the long run.

In summary, our results show that policy-induced distortions in the form of export bans or export levies on agricultural commodities create disincentives for farmers to produce, rendering these policies self-defeating and unsustainable in the long run. Moreover, export restrictions can be welfare-reducing and welfare losses tend to be biased against poorer farm households. Unfortunately, when short-term political motivations outweigh longer-term socio-economic considerations, these adverse effects may be conveniently overlooked by policymakers.

Our results also highlight a more general concern about uncertain and incoherent agricultural policy environments that prevail in so many Sub-Saharan African countries, namely that they perpetuate a subsistence farming culture rather than encouraging commercial crop cultivation. This has negative consequences for supply of marketed foods and intermediate inputs required by agroprocessing sectors. Ultimately this is inconsistent with the stated economic transformation ambitions of so many African countries, articulated in the case of Malawi in its second Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS II) as shifting its economy from being a "predominantly importing and consuming economy to a predominantly producing and exporting economy" ([@b0070]).
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A.1. STAGE model parameters, variables and equations {#s0090}
----------------------------------------------------

The STAGE model is a member of the class of CGE models that are descendants of the approach to CGE modelling described by [@b0050]. While the accounts of the SAM determine the agents that can be included within the model, and the transactions recorded in the SAM identify the transactions that took place, the model is defined by the behavioral relationships. These behavioral relationships are a mix of non-linear and linear functions that govern how economic agents respond to exogenously determined changes in the model's parameters and/or variables.

Sections [3.1](#s0030){ref-type="sec"}, [3.3](#s0050){ref-type="sec"} in the main text provided an overview of the key behavioral relationships and closure options. A more detailed technical description of the model is provided in [@b0100]. The model code is available directly from the model developers on request. For ease of reference, we include a list of selected model sets, parameters, variables and equations in [Table A1](#t0035){ref-type="table"}, [Table A2](#t0040){ref-type="table"}, respectively.Table A1Key model sets, parameters and variables in the STAGE model.Sets and sub-setsDescriptionAlias*c*CommoditiesEach set has an *alias* that has the same membership as the corresponding basic set. The notation follows the addition of a '*p*' suffix to the set label. Example: the alias\
for *c* is *cp*.*A*Activities*m*Margins*f*Factors*h*Households*g*Government*e*Enterprises*i*Investment*w*The rest of the world  Parameters (lowercase letters)DescriptionSource*ioqttqq~m,c~*Quantity of trade and transport services per unit of commodity deliveredModel calibration*beta~c,h~*Marginal budget sharesModel calibration*qcdconst~c,h~*Subsistence demand by household *h*Model calibration*ioqtdqd~c,a~*Leontief input coefficients of demand for commodity *c* by activity *a*Model calibration*dstocconst~c~*Change in stock of commodity *c*Model calibration$\delta_{a}^{x}$, $\delta_{a}^{\mathit{va}}$Share parameters at thetop and lower level of the production nestModel calibration*ac~c~*, *at~c~*Shift parameters in the CES and CET in tradeModel calibration$\delta_{c}$, $\rho_{c}$,Share parameters in the CES and CET in tradeModel calibration*rhoc~c~*, *rhot~c~*Substitution parameters in the CES and CET in tradeAssumption$\mathit{Rhoc}_{a}^{x}$, $\rho_{a}^{\mathit{va}}$Substitution parameters at the top and lower level of the production nestAssumptionVariables (uppercase letters)Description$\mathit{PQS}_{c}$,$\mathit{PQD}_{c}$Composite supply and consumer prices$\mathit{PM}_{c}$, $\mathit{PD}_{c}$,$\mathit{PE}_{c}$Prices of imported, domestically supplied and exported commodities$\mathit{PTT}_{m}$Price of trade and transport margin$\mathit{QM}_{c}$, $\mathit{QD}_{c}$,$\mathit{QE}_{c}$Quantities of imported, domestically supplied and exported commodities$\mathit{QQ}_{c}$Composite supply of commodity *c*$\mathit{QCD}_{c\text{,}h}$Household *h* consumption of commodity *c*$\mathit{QXC}_{c}$Domestic production of commodity *c*$\mathit{QVA}_{a}$, $\mathit{QINT}_{a}$,$\mathit{QX}_{a}$Value added, intermediate, and total output$\mathit{QINTD}_{c}$Quantity of intermediate demand of commodity *c*$\mathit{QTTD}_{c}$Quantity of commodity *c* required to produce a unit of margins service$\mathit{QENTD}_{c\text{,}e}$, $\mathit{QGD}_{c}$, $\mathit{QINVD}_{c}$Enterprise (*e*), government and investment demand for commodity *c*$\mathit{YH}_{h}$$\mathit{HEXP}_{h}$Income and expenditure of household *h*$\mathit{SHH}_{h}$, $\mathit{TYH}_{h}$Saving and tax rate by household *h*$\mathit{TS}_{c}$,$\mathit{TEX}_{c}$,$\mathit{TV}_{c}$Sales, excise and value added tax of commodity *c*$\mathit{HOHO}_{\mathit{hp}\text{,}h}$Inter-household transfers$\mathit{AD}_{a}^{x}$, $\mathit{AD}_{a}^{\mathit{va}}$Shift/efficiency parameters at the top and lower level of the production nest$\mathit{ADFD}_{f\text{,}a}$Shift parameter for factor *f* and activity *a*$\mathit{FD}_{f\text{,}a}$, $\mathit{FS}_{f}$Factor demand by activity *a* and total supplyTable A2Selected STAGE model equations by equation blocks.EquationsDescription*Commodity price block* $\mathit{PQS}_{c} \cdot = \frac{\mathit{PD}_{c} \ast \mathit{QD}_{c} + \mathit{PM}_{c} \ast \mathit{QM}_{c}}{\mathit{QQ}_{c}}$Composite supply price for commodity *c* $\mathit{PXC}_{c} = \frac{\mathit{PD}_{c} \ast \mathit{QD}_{c} + \mathit{PE}_{c} \ast \mathit{QE}_{c}}{\mathit{QXC}_{c}}$Supply price of domestically produced commodity *c* $\mathit{PQD}_{c} = \mathit{PQS}_{c} \ast (1 + \mathit{TS}_{c} + \mathit{TEX}_{c}) + \sum_{m}(\mathit{ioqttqq}_{m\text{,}c} \ast \mathit{PTT}_{m})$Consumer price for commodity *c* in domestic markets  *Household consumption block* $\mathit{HEXP}_{h} = ((\mathit{YH}_{h} \ast (1 - \mathit{TYH}_{h})) \ast (1 - \mathit{SHH}_{h})) - \left( {\sum_{\mathit{hp}}\mathit{HOHO}_{\mathit{hp}\text{,}h}} \right)$Household disposable income after tax, savings and transfers are deducted. $\mathit{QCD}_{c\text{,}h} \ast \mathit{PQD}_{c} \ast \mathit{TV}_{c} = \left( {\mathit{PQD}_{c} \ast \mathit{QCD}_{c\text{,}h} \ast \mathit{qcdconst}_{c\text{,}h} \ast (1 + \mathit{TV}_{c})} \right) \ast \left( {\mathit{HEXP}_{h} - \sum_{\mathit{cp}}\mathit{PQD}_{\mathit{cp}} \ast \mathit{qcdconst}_{\mathit{cp}\text{,}h} \ast (1 + \mathit{TV}_{\mathit{cp}})} \right)$Demand from household *h* for good *c*  *Production block* $\mathit{QX}_{a} = \mathit{AD}_{a}^{x} \ast \left( {\delta_{a}^{x} \ast \mathit{QVA}_{a}^{- \mathit{rhoc}_{a}^{x}} + \left( {1 - \delta_{a}^{x}} \right) \ast \mathit{QINT}_{a}^{- \mathit{rhoc}_{a}^{x}}} \right)^{\frac{- 1}{\mathit{rhoc}_{a}^{x}}}$CES production function at the top level $\mathit{QVA}_{a} = \mathit{AD}_{a}^{\mathit{va}} \ast \left\lbrack {\sum_{f}\delta_{a}^{\mathit{va}} \ast \mathit{ADFD}_{f\text{,}a} \ast \mathit{FD}_{f\text{,}a}^{- \rho_{a}^{\mathit{va}}}} \right\rbrack^{\frac{- 1}{\rho_{a}^{\mathit{va}}}}$CES production function at the lower level for value added $\mathit{QINTD}_{c} = \sum_{a}\mathit{ioqtdqd}_{c\text{,}a} \ast \mathit{QINT}_{a}$Leontief technology on intermediate inputs at the lower level  *Trade block* $\mathit{QQ}_{c} = \mathit{ac}_{c} \ast \left( {\delta_{c} \ast \mathit{QM}_{c}^{- \mathit{rhoc}_{c}} + (1 - \delta_{c}) \ast \mathit{QD}_{c}^{- \mathit{rhoc}_{c}}} \right)^{\frac{- 1}{\mathit{rhoc}_{c}}}$CES function for domestic supply of commodity *c* $\mathit{QXC}_{c} = \mathit{at}_{c} \ast \left( {\gamma_{c} \ast \mathit{QE}_{c}^{- \mathit{rhot}_{c}} + (1 - \gamma_{c}) \ast \mathit{QD}_{c}^{- \mathit{rhot}_{c}}} \right)^{\frac{- 1}{\mathit{rhot}_{t}}}$CET function for production transformation  *Market clearing block* $\mathit{FS}_{f} = \sum_{a}\mathit{FD}_{f\text{,}a}$Factor market clearing condition $\mathit{QQ}_{c} = \mathit{QTTD}_{c} + \mathit{QINTD}_{c} + \sum_{h}\mathit{QCD}_{c\text{,}h} + \sum_{e}\mathit{QENTD}_{c\text{,}e} + \mathit{QGD}_{c} + \mathit{QINVD}_{c} + \mathit{dstocconst}_{c}$Total domestic demand for commodities

A.2. Social Accounting Matrix {#s0095}
-----------------------------

The 2010 Malawi Social Accounting Matrix used to calibrate the STAGE model was developed by [@b0115]. This SAM was most recently used in a peer-reviewed article by [@b0125]. The 2010 SAM is part of the family of SAMs produced under the Nexus Project, a collaboration between various international organizations, national statistical agencies and research institutions with the aim of improving the quality of SAMs through establishing common data standards, procedures and classification systems for constructing and updating national SAMs (see [@b0130]).

Below we provide a brief description of the 2010 Malawi SAM. A more detailed and generic description of Nexus SAMs is provided in [@b0130]. In fact, [@b0130] describes a more recent 2014 Malawi SAM, which was produced subsequent to the analysis in this paper being concluded. However, we did not consider updating our results using the new SAM since it represents a time when the maize export ban was active; in contrast, the 2010 SAM represents a time when the policy was not in place and is therefore better suited to simulating the "before and after" effects of the policy.

[Table A3](#t0045){ref-type="table"} presents the macro-SAM. The detailed 2010 micro-SAM, which can be obtained from these authors, is disaggregated across 59 activities (set a in [Table A1](#t0035){ref-type="table"}), 19 of which are in agriculture, 20 in industry, and 11 in services. Factors of production (*f*) include labor groups, which are disaggregated into three education categories: incomplete primary school; completed primary school (Grade 8); and completed secondary school (Grade 12). Within agriculture, capital value-added is divided into land (including small, medium, and large-scale) and livestock. Each activity in the Malawi SAM produces only one commodity, but some commodities are produced by different types of producers (e.g., estate farmers and smallholders), which means the SAM only distinguishes 50 commodity types (*c*).

Households (*h*) are disaggregated by rural and urban per capita expenditure percentiles (defined at the national level). Income and expenditure data are from the 2010/11 Integrated Household Survey (IHS3). Household own-consumption of agricultural produce at producer prices is captured in the activity account (see [Table A3](#t0045){ref-type="table"}).Table A32010 Macro SAM for Malawi (Millions of Kwacha).Activities (*a*)Commodities (*c*)Factors (*f*)Enterprises (*e*)Households (*h*)Government (*g*)Investment (*i*)Rest of the World (*w*)TotalActivities1,566,806147,1401,713,946Commodities755,347143,547753,118156,980171,366182,0042,162,362Factors958,59968958,667Enterprises198,16028,98832,976260,125Households733,512196,36227,9752510960,359Government87,01857,24348,12342,966235,349Savings6227971518,641136,783171,366Rest of the World364,99026,99429322632765397,306Total1,713,9462,162,362958,667260,125960,359235,349171,366397,306[^12]

The SAM further identifies government (set *g*, [Table A1](#t0035){ref-type="table"}), investment (*i*) and foreign accounts (*w*) (see [@b0130] for details) and its macro-structure is consistent with official supply-use tables, national accounts, government budgets, and balance of payments data for the year 2010. Its comprehensiveness, detail, adherence to macroeconomic accounting principles, and consistency with official national accounts data makes it an ideal database for conducting economywide impact assessments.

A.3. Sensitivity tests {#s0100}
----------------------

See [Table A4](#t0050){ref-type="table"}, [Table A5](#t0055){ref-type="table"}.Table A4Variation on income elasticity (LES function) for maize grain and flour consumption (compare *sim1a* and *sim1b*).Short run closure (*sim1a*)Long run closure (*sim1b*)Maize grain consumptionGrain flour consumptionMaize grain consumptionGrain flour consumptionBenchmark result (compare [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Benchmark result (compare [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Benchmark result (compare [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Benchmark result (compare [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Income elasticity 25% lowerIncome elasticity 25% higherIncome elasticity 25% lowerIncome elasticity 25% higherIncome elasticity 25% lowerIncome elasticity 25% higherIncome elasticity 25% lowerIncome elasticity 25% higherRural households4.6−0.440.304.6−0.400.23−1.70.08−0.030.9−0.040.01 Rural households (by farm type)  Smallholder farmers6.0−0.610.435.6−0.520.33−1.3−0.170.031.2−0.080.07  Medium-scale farmers4.0−0.350.232.9−0.130.02−2.10.17−0.06−0.10.08−0.10  Large farmers3.3−0.400.312.4−0.200.11−1.80.21−0.120.40.08−0.11  Non-farm households11.7−1.351.047.1−0.920.705.0−0.360.253.7−0.340.25 Rural households (by poverty)0.000.000.000.00  Rural poor5.0−0.350.204.5−0.260.10−2.20.04−0.050.10.08−0.08  Rural non-poor4.5−0.470.344.6−0.500.34−1.60.10−0.031.5−0.130.08  Urban households11.2−1.521.278.7−1.050.812.6−0.250.244.1−0.340.24 Urban households (by poverty)  Urban poor8.7−0.960.717.7−0.840.59−0.60.060.023.1−0.170.07  Urban non-poor11.3−1.551.298.7−1.050.822.7−0.260.254.2−0.340.25  All households5.5−0.570.426.1−0.640.45−1.20.040.002.1−0.150.10[^13][^14]Table A5Variation on elasticity of transformation (CET function) for oilseed export levy without processing subsidy (compare *sim2a* and *sim2b*).Domestic production (*QXC*)Exports (*QE*)Value added (*QVA*)Benchmark result (compare [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Benchmark result (compare [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Benchmark result (compare [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Transformation elasticity 25% lowerTransformation elasticity 25% higherTransformation elasticity 25% lowerTransformation elasticity 25% higherTransformation elasticity 25% lowerTransformation elasticity 25% higher**Short run closure (sim2a)**Field crops, staples & pulses0.00.000.00−1.9−0.090.07−0.30.000.00 Maize0.00.000.000.30.000.000.60.000.00 Other cereals0.00.000.000.00.000.000.30.000.00 Roots0.00.000.000.20.000.000.80.000.00 Pulses0.00.000.000.00.000.000.50.000.00 Groundnut0.00.010.01−11.60.000.00−9.10.000.00 Oilseeds0.00.000.00−0.8−0.110.09−14.1−0.050.04Fruits & vegetables0.00.000.000.00.000.000.40.000.00Export & other crops0.00.000.000.00.000.000.70.000.00Food & agroprocessing0.10.000.000.00.000.000.00.000.00 Meat processing0.00.000.00−0.3−0.010.000.20.000.00 Grain milling0.10.000.000.20.000.000.00.000.00 Export agroprocessing0.00.000.000.00.000.000.00.000.00 Other food-processing^\*^0.10.01−0.010.30.03−0.02−0.1−0.010.01Mining & other manufacturing0.00.000.00−0.10.000.000.00.000.00Domestic production (*QXC*)Exports (*QE*)Value added (*QVA*)Benchmark result (compare [Table 4a](#t0020){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Benchmark result (compare [Table 4a](#t0020){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Benchmark result (compare [Table 4a](#t0020){ref-type="table"})Deviation from benchmark (%-point change)Transformation elasticity 25% lowerTransformation elasticity 25% higherTransformation elasticity 25% lowerTransformation elasticity 25% higherTransformation elasticity 25% lowerTransformation elasticity 25% higher**Long run closure (sim2b)**Field crops, staples & pulses−3.2−0.010.01−79.0−0.420.36−2.9−0.010.01 Maize0.10.000.002.10.000.001.20.000.00 Other cereals−0.30.000.001.70.000.000.70.000.00 Roots0.10.000.002.90.010.001.30.000.00 Pulses0.10.000.000.00.000.000.50.000.00 Groundnut−4.80.000.00−27.60.010.00−4.30.000.00 Oilseeds−93.2−0.240.21−94.8−0.520.45−93.0−0.240.21Fruits & vegetables0.10.000.001.00.000.000.90.000.00Export & other crops12.30.03−0.0212.20.05−0.0516.50.04−0.03Food & agroprocessing4.50.02−0.0111.10.02−0.022.60.000.00 Meat processing−0.10.01−0.01−0.20.01−0.01−0.40.01−0.01 Grain milling0.00.02−0.010.80.02−0.02−1.10.02−0.01 Export agroprocessing9.20.01−0.0111.50.02−0.016.40.01−0.01 Other food-processing^\*^−0.30.04−0.03−1.10.12−0.100.0−0.050.04Mining & other manufacturing−0.80.000.00−5.4−0.020.01−1.30.000.00[^15]
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[^1]: *Source:* Malawi Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 2010 ([@b0115]) and STAGE model results.

[^2]: *Note:* (^\*^) Simulation results reflect changes relative to the model base (2010). In the case of the export ban results, changes are relative to the "adjusted" baseline generated for this scenario, as discussed in Section [3.2](#s0035){ref-type="sec"}. *Note* (^\*\*^): Other food processing includes cooking oil.

[^3]: *Source:* STAGE model results.

[^4]: *Note (^\*^):* Other food processing includes cooking oil.

[^5]: *Source:* STAGE model results.

[^6]: *Note:* (^\*^) "Poor" households here are defined as the bottom two per capita expenditure quintiles, which translates to a poverty rate of 40 percent. The remaining quintiles are considered non-poor.

[^7]: *Source:* STAGE model results.

[^8]: *Note (^\*^):* Other food processing includes cooking oil.

[^9]: *Source:* STAGE model results.

[^10]: *Note (^\*^):* Other food processing includes cooking oil.

[^11]: *Source:* STAGE model results.

[^12]: *Source:*[@b0115].

[^13]: *Source:* STAGE model results

[^14]: *Note:* (^\*^) "Poor" households here are defined as the bottom two per capita expenditure quintiles, which translates to a poverty rate of 40 percent. The remaining quintiles are considered non-poor.

[^15]: *Source:* STAGE model results.
